By Cliff Stanley
Nigeria’s voters’ register is not a bureaucratic spreadsheet; it is the legal foundation on which every ballot, result and claim of victory must rest. The discovery of suspected AI-generated photographs, duplicate records and other irregularities in the preliminary register for the 2027 general election is therefore not a technical embarrassment. It is a constitutional alarm.
INEC’s Director of Information and Communication Technology, Dr Lawrence Bayode, has said that some registration officers used authorised login credentials to introduce questionable entries, including AI-generated images, into the registration system. He said the commission’s Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) flagged the anomalies, while other defects resulted from poor registration practice.
That admission is important but it is not yet accountability.
The preliminary register was published online on October 26, 2026, after physical display at registration areas from October 9 to 15. It contained more than 103.4 million registered voters. Public scrutiny soon identified suspicious images, apparent duplicates and other anomalies.
Bayode’s explanation, reported across multiple outlets, was that INEC had not deployed AI for voter registration, but that some photographs in the preliminary register appeared AI-generated. He attributed the introduction of irregular records to registration officers who allegedly abused their system access.
INEC says ABIS identified 268 records for review and that verification, adjudication and data-cleaning will be completed before the final register is certified on December 15, 2026.
The commission has also received 5,400 claims and objections arising from the public display.
These facts justify concern, but they do not by themselves prove a coordinated plot by INEC, the All Progressives Congress (APC) and “organised crime” to fix the 2027 election. Allegations of that gravity require evidence: named officers, system logs, forensic findings, beneficiaries, prosecutions and court-tested conclusions. What the episode does prove is that the register’s integrity can be compromised from within, and that public confidence cannot be restored by assurances alone.
A voters’ register performs three democratic functions. It defines who may vote; it limits the opportunity for impersonation, multiple voting and fabricated participation; and it provides the evidentiary basis for auditing results.
If fictitious voters can enter the register, the danger is not merely that fake people may vote. It is that real votes can be diluted, results can be inflated in targeted places, and losing parties can be given a credible reason to reject the outcome. Electoral legitimacy depends not only on counting votes accurately, but on knowing that only qualified, living, registered persons were permitted to cast them.
The alleged misuse of official login credentials is especially serious. It suggests that the vulnerability was not simply external hacking or ordinary clerical error, but possible insider abuse of administrative power.
INEC should treat this as a forensic and institutional emergency, not a public-relations problem. Its response must be visible, verifiable and independent.
- Publish the scale and pattern of contamination
INEC should disclose, in aggregate and without exposing personal biometric data:
The total number of flagged, suspended, corrected and deleted entries.
The distribution of irregular records by state, local government, registration area and registration centre.
The categories of defect: suspected AI-generated images, duplicate biometrics, dead or implausible registrants, incomplete data, and records created through suspicious access patterns.
The dates and times of suspicious entries, where disclosure does not compromise an investigation.
Secrecy about the scale of the problem would confirm the public’s worst fears. Transparency about methodology, while protecting voter privacy, is the only democratic response. - Preserve and audit the evidence
INEC must immediately preserve immutable copies of the registration database, ABIS reports, officer login logs, device records, IP addresses, audit trails, upload histories and all records connected to the flagged entries.
It should commission an independent forensic audit by credible external experts, with observers drawn from registered political parties, civil society, the media, the National Assembly and, where appropriate, security agencies. The audit should examine not only the 268 records publicly reported, but whether the same methods produced wider contamination. - Identify and discipline culpable officers
Where evidence shows that an officer knowingly inserted false records, misused credentials, facilitated impersonation, accepted inducements or obstructed investigation, INEC should suspend the officer pending due process, revoke system access, and refer the matter to law-enforcement and anti-corruption authorities.
Sanctions should be proportionate to culpability, but sufficiently severe to deter repetition:
Administrative interdiction and removal from electoral duties for negligent registration failures.
Dismissal and permanent ineligibility for electoral employment for deliberate falsification.
Criminal prosecution for forgery, falsification of records, unlawful access to computer systems, conspiracy, corruption or electoral offences.
Recovery of any benefit obtained and publication of final disciplinary outcomes, subject to fair-hearing requirements.
Punishment must not stop at junior field officers. If supervisors, contractors, political actors or security personnel enabled or benefited from the misconduct, they must face the same legal process. Accountability that reaches only the powerless is not accountability; it is scapegoating. - Correct the register before certification
Before December 15, INEC should complete a transparent clean-up that includes:
Removal or quarantine of every record that cannot be verified through lawful registration evidence.
De-duplication using biometric and demographic checks, with a fair appeal process for wrongly flagged citizens.
Re-verification of questionable photographs against original capture records, where available.
Public notice to affected voters and a practical mechanism for claims, objections and appeals.
Publication of a pre- and post-cleaning reconciliation report showing how many entries were added, removed, corrected and retained.
The final register should not merely be declared clean. It should be demonstrably clean. - Harden the system against recurrence
INEC should introduce mandatory multi-factor authentication for registration officers; role-based access controls; real-time anomaly detection; geolocation and device verification; tamper-evident audit logs; periodic external penetration testing; and independent review of high-risk registration centres.
No officer should be able to create or alter voter records without a traceable digital footprint. No bulk change should occur without supervisory approval and automated alerts. And no electoral database should depend on the honesty of insiders alone.
The political parties’ duty
The APC, as the governing party, has a particular obligation to demand a full investigation. Silence may be politically convenient, but it is strategically self-defeating: a tainted register damages the legitimacy of any future APC victory as much as it damages the credibility of the process itself.
Opposition parties, meanwhile, should pursue evidence through lawful channels: formal petitions, requests for audit participation, litigation where necessary, and public documentation of specific irregularities. They should resist the temptation to convert suspicion into verdicts. The country needs credible challenge, not indiscriminate accusation.
Civil society, the media and citizens should continue scrutinising the register, but must handle personal data responsibly. The goal is to expose systemic failure, not to publish private biometric information or harass innocent voters.
INEC’s promise to clean the register before December 15 is necessary but insufficient.
The commission must meet a higher standard: publish what it found; explain how it happened; identify who was responsible through due process; remove every unverifiable record; invite independent verification; prosecute proven offenders; and reform the system so the same abuse cannot recur.
If INEC does these things, the episode could become evidence that Nigeria’s electoral institutions can detect, correct and punish internal abuse. If it does not, the preliminary register will remain a political wound heading into 2027.
Nigeria does not need a perfect register to hold a credible election. But it needs a register whose defects are known, corrected, independently verified and credibly explained. Anything less leaves the 2027 election vulnerable to a question no winner should want to answer: How many of the votes that produced this victory belonged to people who never existed?
Cliff Stanley political scientist Public Theologian write from Jos Ecwa Theological Seminary JETS.
